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Female Directors and Earnings Management: Evidence from UK companies 
 
Abstract 
Since the gender diversity of boards and the reporting of earnings are two of the most debated 
issues in the corporate world, the paper examines how the presence of women directors on 
the corporate board influences earnings management practices. We found that firms with a 
higher number of female and independent female directors are adopting restrained earnings 
management practices in the UK. We further made a distinction between high- and low-debt 
firms, and the outcomes reveal that female directors have a positive effect on the earnings 
management in low debt firms. The paper contributes to the debate on gender diversity on 
boards, and its impact on the use of accounting discretion in financial reporting. 
  
Female Directors and Earnings Management: Evidence from UK companies1 
 
1 .  Introduction 
The literature on board diversity and firms’ financial performance (e.g. Adams et al. 2009; 
Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 2008; Farrell and Hersch 2005; Carter et al. 2003; Erhardt et al. 
2003) broadly supports the view that the presence of women representatives on the board 
enhances the firm’s financial performance. The recent Davies Report (2011) has provided a 
business case for gender diversity on boards based on its potential impact on improving 
performance, accessing the widest talent pool, achieving better corporate governance and 
being more responsive to the market. However, the issue of improving the gender balance of 
corporate boards has continued as a worldwide concern. For instance, in the US, women held 
only 16.9% of Fortune 500 board seats in 2013, and less than one-fifth of companies had 25% 
or more women directors, while one-tenth had no women serving on their boards (Catalyst 
2013). The Davies Report (2011) further shows the levels of under-representation of women 
on corporate boards across the globe, ranging from 3.6% in the industrialised Asia-Pacific 
region to 23% in Sweden and the Philippines; the figure for the UK was 9.6%. 
 
Flexibility in accounting standards allows managers to estimate and project accounting 
numbers different from the underlying economic conditions of a firm. For instance, under 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), managers can exercise discretion over 
accounting-reported earnings to maximize the information value of the firm’s earnings. 
Although this is an accepted strategy used by management in the corporate world for income 
smoothing, excessive use of this practice is detrimental. Furthermore, it has been 
acknowledged that managers may have an incentive to manipulate accounting earnings either 
to maximize the firm’s value or obtain some private gain at the expense of shareholders 
(Beneish 2001; Christie and Zimmerman 1994). In the context of a conflict, managers 
exercise discretion over accounting earnings either to mislead shareholders about the firm’s 
financial performance or to gain some private benefits at the expense of other stakeholders 
(i.e. opportunistic earnings management) (Healy and Wahlen 1999). The adaptable behaviour 
of managers through various reporting methods and estimates reflects an inaccurate picture of 
                                                          
1 The authors are thankful to the Institute of Global Finance and Development, Lancashire 
Business School for the financial support for the study.  
the company’s financial fundamentals, such as in the accounting scandals involving major 
corporations such as Enron and WorldCom2. In short, the argument is that earnings 
management reduces the quality of earnings because the information in the financial reports 
does not reflect the underlying economic conditions of a firm. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. The literature on female directors and earnings 
management, and the key questions, are set out in section 2, while section 3 discusses the 
empirical research methods used. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes.    
 
2 .  Female Directors and Earnings Management – the key questions 
In business contexts, women are more ethical in the workplace and less likely to engage in 
unethical behaviour to gain financial rewards (Khazanchi 1995; Betz et al. 1989). Gul et al. 
(2009) argue that not only do females demonstrate greater risk aversion and ethical 
behaviour, but they are also better at obtaining voluntary information which may reduce 
information asymmetry between female directors and managers. Women are more cautious 
and less aggressive than men in a variety of decision-making contexts (Byrnes et al. 1999), 
and are less likely to take risks particularly in the financial decision environment (Powell and 
Ansic 1997). There is therefore a greater likelihood of a restrained approach to earnings 
management (Gul et al. 2009). In a similar vein, Krishnan and Parsons (2008) found that the 
quality of earnings management is higher for firms with more female directors, and argued 
that women are likely to be more ethical in their judgement and behaviour than men. 
However, in contrast to these findings, Sun et al. (2011) found no evidence for the impact of 
female representation on audit committees and earnings management, while Thiruvadi and 
Huang (2011) found that the presence of female directors on the audit committee is 
negatively related to earnings management. In light of the differing views, we are enquiring 
into the relationship between female directors and earnings management in the UK. 
 
                                                          
2 In many instnces, the ‘earning guidance’ prevalent in the corporate world is a high-stake 
game where the management seeks to hit the targets set by analysts, based on extensive 
private conversations between managers and analysts (Fuller and Jensen, 2010). On the 
basis of real-world experience, one can argue that opportunistic reasons for earnings 
management have intentionally influenced stakeholders, with a degree of misinterpretation 
of company performance. 
In this paper, we further examine whether the gender of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
affects the level of earnings management. CFOs have a strong role in companies, due to their 
primary responsibility of financial reporting. Jiang et al. (2010) found that the magnitude of 
accruals and the likelihood of beating analyst forecasts are more sensitive to CFO equity 
incentives than to those of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Although a significant amount 
of accounting research has been devoted to testing the association between the effectiveness 
of corporate governance and audit committees on earnings management (Lin and Hwang 
2010; Benkraiem 2009; Ebrahim 2007; Xie et al. 2003; Klein 2002), only a few studies have 
examined the association between gender diversity on the board of directors and earnings 
management. For instance, Barua et al. (2011) investigated the association between CFO 
gender and earnings management and found that firms with female CFOs have lower 
discretionary accruals than firms with male CFOs. Similar findings were provided by Peni 
and Vähämaa (2010), who examined the association between CFO and CEO gender and 
earnings management, and found that firms with female CFOs have income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals, indicating that female CFOs are following more conservative financial 
reporting rules and standards. However, they found no association between earnings 
management and CEO gender. In contrast, Gavious et al. (2012) found that companies with 
female CEOs have less earnings management than those with males, with a negative 
relationship between female executives and earnings management. Instead, Hili and Affes 
(2012) found no association between earnings management and the presence of female 
directors on boards and audit committees in French and US companies respectively. 
 
Further to this, we explore the effect of female directors on earnings management in both 
high- and low-debt firms. We identify high-debt firms as those that rely more on debt 
financing, with larger boards and more independent directors (Coles et al. 2008; Faleye 
2007). In contrast, low-debt firms depend on the firm-specific knowledge of insiders and 
have smaller boards with a greater number of insiders. The findings of pooled OLS 
regression reveal that the presence of a number of female directors on the board constrains 
the level of earnings management. These findings are consistent with the previous studies of 
Gavious et al. (2012), Peni and Vähämaa (2010) and Krishnan and Parsons (2008), who 
found that firms with a higher number of women on the board are less likely to manipulate 
earnings. The key research questions are:  (1) is there an association between the number of 
female directors and earnings management? (2) is this relationship the same in low- and high-
debt firms? and; (3) is there an association between CFO gender and earnings management?  
  
3 .  Methods 
 
It has been argued that managers are more likely to manage earnings through accruals since it 
is more difficult to be detected by outsiders (Kothari et al. 2005; Dechow et al. 1995; Jones 
1991). In addition, managers can practise their discretion either on long- or short-term 
discretionary accruals to manipulate earnings. However, Becker et al. (1998) argue that 
managers have greater discretion over current accruals than long-term ones. In this paper, we 
use the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995)3 to estimate current discretionary 
accruals. The following cross-sectional regression equation is used to estimate current 
accruals4. 
  
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡/𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛽𝑖𝑡[1 𝐴𝑖𝑡−1]⁄ + 𝛽1𝑖𝑡[(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 −  ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡) 𝐴𝑖𝑡−1]⁄ + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                      (1) 
 
Where current accruals  CAit is net income before extraordinary items minus cash flow from 
operation for firm I in year t, ∆REVit donates the change in revenue for firm i in year t, 
∆RECit is the change in receivable for firm i in year t, and Ait−1 is total assets at the 
beginning of the year t for firm me. The residual of equation 1 is current discretionary 
accruals.  
 
After estimating current discretionary accrual, the association between earnings management 
and the number of female directors on the board is investigated with ordinary least squares 
(OLS):  
                                                          
3 Based on the assumption that accruals are likely to result from changes in a firm’s economic 
conditions, Jones (1990) proposes a regression-based model that controls for change in 
revenue and depreciation. She relates  total accruals to the change in revenue (∆REV) and 
gross property, plant and equipment (PPT) as follows: 
TAit Ait−1 =∝1 (1 Ait−1)⁄ +∝2 (∆REVit Ait−1)⁄ +∝3 (PPTit Ait−1)⁄⁄  
Given that revenue may be subject to earnings manipulation by managers (e.g. increasing 
sales recognition near year-end period), using the Jones model will remove part of the 
discretionary accruals. In response to the limitation of the Jones model, Dechow et al. 
(1995) developed a modified version of the model by subtracting the change in receivables 
(∆REC) from change in revenues (∆REV) to exclude the element in the change in revenue 
that is expected to be managed through managerial discretion. 
4 Following  the studies of Subramanyam (1996) and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), industry 
groups with fewer than six observations are excluded from the sample. 
 𝐶𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 = ∝0+∝1 𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + ∝2  𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + ∝3 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + ∝4 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +∝5 𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +
 ∝6 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ∝7 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + ∝8 𝐺𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + ∝9 𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 +∝10 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 + ∑ ∝𝑘
𝑛−1
𝑘=1 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖
𝑘 +
 ∑ 𝜔𝑦
2011
𝑌=2005 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                            (2) 
 
Where CDAit is current discretionary accruals for me in year t. The independent variables in 
the regression specification model are NFEM, denoting to the number of female directors on 
the board; INFEM, the number of independent female directors on the board; EXFEM, the 
number of executive female directors on the board; and CFO, a dummy variable equal to one 
if the CFO of the firm is female, and zero otherwise.  
 
We use control variables in the model for firm-specific characteristics that may affect the 
level of earnings management. These control variables are: SIZEit measured as the natural 
logarithm of total assets for firm i in year t; OCFit, net operating cash flow divided by total 
assets; ROAit, is on assets; LEVit, financial leverage measured as total liabilities scaled by 
total assets; GSALESit, the sales growing ratio; MBit, is market to book value; and LOSSit, a 
dummy variable taking the value one if firm i reported negative net income in year t, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Previous studies have suggested that the above firm-specific characteristics are useful in 
predicting earnings management (Kim et al. 2012; Hong and Andersen 2011; Chih et al. 
2008). SIZE is included in the regression to control for the potential impact of firm size on 
the earnings management. There is no agreement in the literature regarding the effect of firm 
size on earnings management. For example, Watts and Zimmerman (1990) argue that  larger 
companies are more likely to perform income-decreasing earnings management. In contrast, 
Richardson (2000) indicates that the market pressure is greater for larger companies because 
they are subject to close scrutiny by investors, an thus more likely to adopt aggressive 
accounting policies which lead to income-increasing earnings management practices. 
Therefore, firm size can be negatively or positively associated with earnings management. 
OCF was included to control for the differences of performance across firms within different 
industries and economic activity on earnings management. The studies by Gul et al. (2009) 
and Dechow et al. (1995) found that firms with a high operational cash flow are less likely to 
engage in income-increasing earnings management because they are already performing well. 
In line with the previous studies, we expect that firms with a high cash flow performance are 
less likely to engage in income-increasing earnings management. ROA is proxy for the firm’s 
financial performance, and it is expected that firms with a higher financial performance tend 
to manage earnings downwards (Watts and Zimmerman 1990). LEV is used as proxy for debt 
covenant violation (Elayan et al. 2008). The findings of the impact of LEV on earnings 
management were mixed (Dechow and Skinner 2000; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Watts 
and Zimmerman 1990). Therefore, financial leverage can be negatively or positively 
associated with earnings management. GSALES and MB are included to control for a firm’s 
growth. It is expected that firms with high growth tend to manage discretionary accruals 
upwards to report increased earnings (Chih et al. 2008). Loss is included to control for the 
financial condition of the firm and it is expected that firms facing financial problems tend to 
engage in income-decreasing earnings management (Healy 1985). The extent of earnings 
management may differ over time and across industries, so we control for time and potential 
industry effect. INDUSTRY in equation 2 is a dummy variable according to Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) and YEAR is a dummy variable that indicates fiscal years.     
 
Our initial sample for the study is the UK FTSE 350 index during the period 2005-2011. 
However, we have removed the categories of regulated, mining and financial industries due 
to their unique characteristics and specific regulations which may affect the results (Klein 
2002; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). In addition, as in the case of prior studies by 
Subramanyam (1996) and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), industries with fewer than six 
observations and the firms with missing data have also been removed from the initial sample. 
The final sample consists of 1,217 firm-year observations during the study period. Table I 
summarises the distribution of the final sample in accordance with the  Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) classification. 
 
  
Table I: Final sample classified by industry 
ICB  Industries 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
0500 Oil & Gas 12 13 13 14 13 16 16 97 
2700 
Industrial Goods & 
Services 
54 56 56 56 57 57 54 390 
3500 Food & Beverage 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 77 
3700 
Personal & 
Household Goods 
10 12 12 13 13 13 13 86 
4500 Health Care 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 56 
5300 Retail 18 20 24 25 25 25 25 162 
5500 Media 7 8 9 9 9 9 10 61 
5700 Travel & Leisure 20 20 21 21 22 22 22 148 
6500 Telecommunications 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 42 
9500 Technology 13 14 15 15 15 15 14 101 
Total 159 168 175 178 179 182 179 1220 
 
Three main resources were used to collect the data, namely FAME, Thomson One Banker, 
and firms’ annual reports. Earnings management and control variables were collected mainly 
from FAME and Thomson One Banker databases, while female director variables were 
gathered from firms’ annual reports.  
4 .  Empirical Findings 
As can be seen from Table II, the mean value of current discretionary accruals (CDA) 
measured by the modified Jones model is -0.020. The findings indicate that UK companies, 
on average, tend to be conservative and prefer to engage in income-decreasing (negative) 
earnings management. Regarding female directors on the board, Table II shows that the 
median number is 1 and the maximum number 4. These results are consistent with the 
previous study of Gavious et al. (2012) who found the average number of female directors on 
the board of Israeli companies was 1 and the maximum 5. The median of independent female 
directors on the board was 0 and the maximum number 3. Table II also reports descriptive 
statistics for various firm-specific variables and shows that the mean company log total assets 
are 3.109, and the mean CFO is 12 percent of total assets. The mean ROA is around 10 
percent of total assets, and financial leverage is 5.9 percent. The rate of annual GSALES is 2 
percent, and MB value is £3.5 million. Some 9 percent of the companies reported negative 
earnings in their financial statements during the given period.  
  
Table II: Descriptive statistics  
 Mean Min P50 Max Sd. 
CDA -0.020 -0.788 -0.018 0.805 0.076 
NFAM 0.813 0.000 1.000 4.000 0.932 
INFAM 0.392 0.000 0.000 3.000 0.632 
FCO 0.028 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.165 
SIZE 3.109 1.318 3.047 5.341 0.673 
OCF 0.120 -0.347 0.103 1.461 0.108 
ROA 0.097 -0.544 0.081 1.341 0.125 
LEV 0.592 -0.100 0.599 1.319 0.211 
GSALES 0.212 -0.774 0.102 8.341 0.569 
MB 3.504 -0.387 2.657 25.055 3.233 
LOSS 0.092 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.289 
CDA = Current discretionary accruals using the modfied Jones model; NFAM= Number of female directors on 
the board; INFAM = Number of independent female directors on the board; FCO = Dummy variable equals 1 if 
the CFO is female, and 0 otherwise; SIZE = Firm size as measured by natural logarithm of total assets; OCF = 
Operating cash flow; ROA = Firm’s performance as measured by net revenue to total assets ratio; LEV = 
Financial leverage as measured by total liabilities to total assets ratio;  GSALES = Growing sales; MB = 
Market-to-book ratio; LOSS = 1 if the firm has a loss, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Recently, UK companies have become more responsive to the demand for a gender-balanced 
board. This gradual shift in recognising the role of females on corporate boards was evident 
in the work of Grosvold et al. (2007), which concluded that the presence of female directors 
in UK FTSE 100 companies had risen from 4.5 percent in 1999 to 10.5 percent in 2005. 
Table III shows the highest propotion of NFAM (12 percent) and INFAM (6 percent) in 
2011. However, with respect to FCOs, Table III shows that the highest number was 7 in 2008 
and the lowest was 3 in 2009, which indicates an inconsistent trend. Table IV shows that the 
highest correlation was between the number of female directors on the board and the number 
of independent female directors with a coefficient of 59 percent and significant at the 1 
percent level5. Therefore, the problem of multicollinearity does not exist between the 
independent variables. 
                                                          
5 According to Gujarati (2003), a coefficient of ±80 percent is considered as the point at a 
which multicollinearity problem might begin, harming the results of the regression analysis. 
 Table III: The number and propotion of females on boards, classified by year 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Board Size 1484 1563 1610 1654 1631 1652 1681 11275 
 No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
NFAM 97 0.065 117 0.075 131 0.081 138 0.083 141 0.086 157 0.095 209 0.124 990 0.088 
INFAM 41 0.028 51 0.033 62 0.039 64 0.039 73 0.045 80 0.048 106 0.063 477 0.042 
FCE 3 0.002 6 0.004 5 0.003 7 0.004 3 0.002 4 0.002 6 0.004 34 0.003 
NFAM= Number of female directors on the board; INFAM = Number of independent female directors on the board; FCE= Dummy variable equals 1 if the CFO 
firm is female and 0 otherwise 
 
TableIV: Correlation matrix 
Variable A B C D E F G H I J K 
A CDA 1.000 
     
     
B NFAM -0.030 1.000 
    
     
C INFAM -0.028 0.587*** 1.000 
   
     
D FCO 0.007 0.312*** 0.037 1.000 
  
     
E SIZE -0.186*** 0.296*** 0.222*** -0.022 1.000 
 
     
F OCF -0.301*** 0.085** 0.010 0.032 -0.127*** 1.000      
G ROA 0.162*** 0.028 -0.040 0.025 -0.097*** 0.455*** 1.000     
H LEV -0.199*** 0.062* 0.039 -0.070* 0.282*** 0.054 -0.017 1.000    
I GSALES 0.005 -0.024 -0.112*** 0.021 -0.208*** -0.041 -0.006 -0.133*** 1.000   
J MB -0.032 -0.017 -0.036 0.011 -0.035 0.195*** 0.216*** 0.266*** -0.089** 1.000  
K LOSS -0.177*** 0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.042 -0.236*** -0.299*** 0.034 0.101*** -0.121*** 1.000 
CDA = Current discretionary accruals using the modfied Jones model; NFAM= Number of female directors on the board; INFAM = Number of independent female 
directors on the board; FCO = Dummy variable equals 1 if the CFO is female, and 0 otherwise;  SIZE = Firm size as measured by natural logarithm of total assets; 
OCF = Operating cash flow; ROA = Firm’s performance as measured by net revenue to total assets ratio; LEV = Financial leverage as measured by total liabilities to 
total assets ratio;  GSALES = Growing sales; MB = Market-to-book ratio; LOSS = Coded 1 if firm has a loss, and 0 otherwise. 
 
The estimation results of our pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are presented in 
Table V. The adjusted R2 of the estimated models vary between 29.8 and 30.3 percent. The 
lower levels of adjusted R2 are normal in this type of accruals regression models (Gavious et 
al. 2012; Srinidhi et al. 2011; Sun et al. 2011). The main independent variables in our models 
are the number of female (NFAM) and independent female directors (INFAM) on the board, 
as well as CFO director variables. As can be seen from Table V, the coefficients of female 
variables are consistently positive in all four regression specifications. Although the results 
show that NFAM and INFAM are positively significant at 0.05 and 0.10 respectively related 
to earnings management, we do not observe any significant association between CFO and 
earnings management. Recall from the descriptive statistics results in Table II that the mean 
value of current discretionary accruals (CDA) is negative (-0.020), so the results in Table V 
suggest that firms with female directors and independent female directors on the boards may 
tend to be more conservative and more likely to practise income-decreasing earnings 
management. These findings are consistent with the study of Gavious et al. (2012) who found 
that female and independent female dirctors on boards in Israel were more likely to engage in 
less earnings management. Peni and Vähämaa (2010) found that the presence of female 
executives in US companies is associated with income-decreasing earnings management. Our 
results also confirmed this trend, but further show that the CFO has no impact on the practice 
of earnings management. 
The results in Table V suggest that the gender of a firm’s directors may affect the quality of 
financial reports. The regression estimates indicate that firms with a higher number of female 
and independent female directors are more likely to practise conservative financial reporting 
policies and tend to employ more income-decreasing earnings management practices than 
their counterparts in firms with a lower number of female and independent female directors6. 
Thus, it can be argued that the presence of female directors on the board may mitigate 
income-increasing earnings management. Although the coefficient of the female FCO is 
consistently positive, the female FCO director seems not to have any statistically significant 
effect on earnings management. Thus, the findings provide empirical evidence for the 
significant impact of female directors on the quality of financial reporting. 
                                                          
6 These findings are consistent with the previous gender literature on conservatism and 
income-decreasing earnings management (Gavious et al. 2012; Peni and Vähämaa 2010; 
Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998; Johnson and Powell 1994). 
Table III: Regression results concerning on the number of female directors on the 
board 
CDA Exp. sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept ? 
0.093*** 
(9.566) 
0.093*** 
(9.594) 
0.095*** 
(9.630) 
0.093*** 
(9.563) 
0.095*** 
(9.661) 
NFAM + 
 
0.006** 
(2.329)   
0.007** 
(2.419) 
INFAM + 
  
0.004* 
(1.833)  
0.004* 
(1.887) 
FCO + 
   
0.004 
(0.510) 
-0.007 
(-0.861) 
SIZE + 
-0.024*** 
(-11.287) 
-0.024*** 
(-11.388) 
-0.025*** 
(-11.307) 
-0.024*** 
(-11.278) 
-0.025*** 
(-11.418) 
OCF + 
-0.267*** 
(-12.757) 
-0.269*** 
(-13.107) 
-0.269*** 
(-12.858) 
-0.267*** 
(-12.743) 
-0.271*** 
(-13.236) 
ROA ? 
0.097*** 
(4.897) 
0.095*** 
4.863 
0.098*** 
(4.931) 
0.097*** 
(4.899) 
0.095*** 
(4.885) 
LEV ? 
-0.033*** 
(-4.411) 
-0.033*** 
(-4.492) 
-0.033*** 
(-4.425) 
-0.033*** 
(-4.382) 
-0.034*** 
(-4.554) 
GSALES ? 
-0.004 
(-1.354) 
-0.004 
(-1.424) 
-0.003 
(-1.319) 
-0.004 
(-1.383) 
-0.004 
(-1.355) 
MB ? 
0.001 
(0.044) 
0.001 
(0.164) 
0.001 
(0.084) 
0.001 
(0.035) 
0.001 
(0.245) 
LOSS ? 
-0.035*** 
(-6.001) 
-0.035*** 
(-6.094) 
-0.035*** 
(-5.980) 
-0.035*** 
(-6.006) 
-0.035*** 
(-6.071) 
Industry  included included included included Included 
Year  included included included included Included 
Observations  1217 1217 1217 1217 1217 
Adjusted R2  0.298 0.301 0.299 0.298 0.303 
F-Value  21.850*** 21.850*** 20.820*** 20.870*** 20.640*** 
CDA = Current discretionary accruals using the modified Jones model; NFAM= Number of female directors 
on the board; INFAM = Number of independent female directors on the board; FCO = Dummy variable 
equals 1 if the CFO of the firm is female, and 0 otherwise; SIZE = Firm size as measured by natural logarithm 
of total assets; OCF = Operating cash flow; ROA = Firm’s performance as measured by net revenue to total 
assets ratio; LEV = Financial leverage as measured by total liabilities to total assets ratio;  GSALES = 
Growing sales; MB = Market-to-book ratio; LOSS = Coded 1 if firm has a loss, and 0 otherwise. 
 
The previous regression specifications are based on the number of female and independent 
female directors and indicate that firms with female and independent female directors are 
associated with conservative and income-decreasing financial reporting. To provide 
reasonable assurance that the preliminary results in Table V are robust to the specifications of 
different measures, we use the proportion of female directors (PFAM) and independent 
female directors (PIFAM) as alternative measures of the presence of female directors on the 
board. Recall that from the previous discussion, the female FCO variable is a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 if the FCO is female, and 0 otherwise.  
As can be seen from Table VI, the coefficients of female variables are consistently positive in 
all four regression specifications and the proportions of females and independent females are 
statically significant at 0.05 and 0.10 percent respectively. However, the coefficient of female 
FCO dummy variable is positive, although it does not reveal any significant association with 
earnings management. These results are in line with the previous findings, indicating that 
firms with female directors tend to be conservative and more likely to practise income-
decreasing earnings management. However, theses results reveal that the presence of a 
female FCO does not effect the direction of earnings management. In light of the above, the 
results in Table VI are robust and consistent with the different measures of female dirctors on 
the boards; the associaction between females and earnings management is not affected by the 
different measures of females.   
 
Table VI: Regression results for the proportion of female directors on the board 
CDA Exp. sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept ? 0.093*** 
9.566 
0.092*** 
9.519 
0.094*** 
9.678 
0.093*** 
9.563 
0.094*** 
9.627 
PFAM +  0.058** 
2.219 
  0.070** 
2.335 
PIFAM +   0.038* 
1.933 
 0.039* 
2.004 
FCO 
+    0.004 
0.510 
-0.007 
-0.936 
SIZE + -0.024*** 
-11.287 
-0.024*** 
-11.196 
-0.025*** 
-11.396 
-0.024*** 
-11.278 
-0.025*** 
-11.312 
OCF + -0.267*** 
-12.757 
-0.268*** 
-13.015 
-0.269*** 
-12.882 
-0.267*** 
-12.743 
-0.270*** 
-13.157 
ROA ? 0.097*** 
4.897 
0.095*** 
4.868 
0.098*** 
4.947 
0.097*** 
4.899 
0.096*** 
4.907 
LEV ? -0.033*** 
-4.411 
-0.034*** 
-4.503 
-0.033*** 
-4.437 
-0.033*** 
-4.382 
-0.034*** 
-4.585 
GSALES ? -0.004 
-1.354 
-0.004 
-1.407 
-0.003 
-1.298 
-0.004 
-1.383 
-0.003 
-1.310 
MB ? 0.001 
0.044 
0.001 
0.152 
0.001 
0.125 
0.001 
0.035 
0.001 
0.278 
LOSS ? -0.035*** 
-6.001 
-0.035*** 
-6.082 
-0.035*** 
-5.990 
-0.035*** 
-6.006 
-0.035*** 
-6.068 
Industry  included included included included included 
Year  included included included included included 
Observations  1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 
Adjusted R2  0.298 0.301 0.3 0.298 0.303 
F-Value  20.690*** 21.850*** 22.180*** 20.940*** 20.870*** 
CDA = Current discretionary accruals using the modified Jones model; PFAM= Proportion of female directors 
on the board; PINFAM = Proportion of independent female directors on the board; FCO = Dummy variable 
equals 1 if the CFO is female, and 0 otherwise; SIZE = Firm size as measured by natural logarithm of total 
assets; OCF = Operating cash flow; ROA = Firm’s performance as measured by net revenue to total assets 
ratio; LEV = Financial leverage as measured by total liabilities to total assets ratio;  GSALES = Growing 
sales; MB = Market-to-book ratio; LOSS = Coded 1 if firm has a loss, and 0 otherwise. 
 
To investigate whether the firm’s characteristics affect the association between females on 
the board and earnings management, we divided the pooled sample into two sub-sets of data 
according to the leverage median (see Coles et al. (2008) and Faleye (2007)). The first data 
set comprises firms that have leverage above the median and is identified as “high-debt 
firms”, while, the second set comprises firms with leverage below the median identified as 
“low-debt firms”. To test whether the board size and number of female directors is 
statistically different from zero in high- and low-debt firms, we applied univariate tests using 
T-test. The results of the univariate tests are presented in Table VII, which shows that the 
mean board size for high-debt firms is larger than its counterpart in low-debt firms; the mean 
difference is statistically significant at the 0.05 percent level7. This result is in line with the 
findings of Coles et al. (2008); and Faleye (2007), who argue that high-debt firms have larger 
boards than low-debt firms. However, the female FCO is significantly different from zero at 
the 0.05 percent level for both high- and low-debt firms, which shows that the presence of a 
female FCO in low-debt firms is higher than its counterpart in high-debt firms. Table VII 
indicates that the mean of Current Discretionary Accruals (CAD) is significantly different 
from zero at 0.01 percent, and that the mean value of CAD in high-debt firms is -0.031 
                                                          
7 The board size variable is not of specific interest and the aim of showing it is to provide 
evidence of whether the mean board size is significantly different from zero for high- and 
low-debt firms, as well as whether high-debt firms have larger or smaller boards than low-
debt firms. 
compared to -0.009 in low-debt firms. This result suggests that high-debt firms are more 
likely to engage in income-decreasing earnings management than are low-debt firms. While 
the means of Cash Flow Operation (CFO), Return on Assets Ratio (ROA) and Losses (LOSS) 
are not statistically significant at any level, the differences between the means of firm size 
(SIZE), leverage (LEV), growing sales (GSALES) and market-to-book ratio (MB) range 
from 0.01 to 0.05 percent.  
 
Table VII: Univariate analysis  
Variable High-debt firms Low-debt firms T-test 
 Mean Sd. Mean Sd.  
CDA -0.031 0.077 -0.009 0.073 5.022*** 
Board Size 9.464 2.460 9.066 2.389 -2.864** 
NFAM 0.865 0.899 0.762 0.962 -1.934* 
INFAM 0.428 0.668 0.356 0.593 -1.970* 
FCO 0.013 0.114 0.043 0.202 3.136** 
SIZE 3.229 0.639 2.990 0.769 -8.392*** 
OCF 0.122 0.092 0.116 0.098 -1.066 
ROA 0.093 0.120 0.100 0.130 0.867 
LEV 0.756 0.138 0.428 0.127 -43.081*** 
GSALES 0.149 0.371 0.275 0.708 3.900*** 
MB 4.283 3.951 2.726 2.025 -8.654** 
LOSS 0.099 0.298 0.085 0.280 -0.802 
 
Furthermore, we examined the question of whether the role of female directors on boards in 
constraining the manipulation of earnings through accruals is affected by the firm’s 
characteristics. The estimation results are presented in Table VIII, in two panels: Panel A 
reports the results for high-debt firms, and Panel B the results for low-debt firms. As can be 
seen from Panel A, the number of female directors, independent female directors as well as a 
dummy female FCO variable in high-debt firms do not affect the earnings management. 
However, Panel B shows that the number of females and independent females on the boards 
of low-debt firms is positively significantly related to earnings management, at 0.01 percent. 
These results indicate that female and independent female directors in low-debt firms are 
more likely to be more conservative and engage in income-decreasing earnings management. 
A possible explanation of these findings is that high-debt firms might have larger boards than 
low-debt firms and that the former might be less effective than the latter (Coles et al. 2008). 
Therefore, the role of female directors might be more effective where they work on smaller 
boards. In both groups, there is no evidence for an association between female CFO and the 
level of earnings management.  
The results in Table VIII show that the number of female directors in low-debt firms follows 
more conservative financial reporting policies and manipulates earnings downwards more 
than do their counterparts in firms with a low number of females. On the other hand, the 
number of female dirctors in high-debt firms does not show any significant association 
related to the level of earnings management. Given that low-debt firms have smaller boards 
than high-debt firms, the results of this study are in line with the argument that smaller boards 
are more effective than larger ones (Coles et al. 2008). Regarding the role of females on 
boards in constraining earnings management, the results show that the role of female director 
on smaller boards is more effective than on larger boards. 
 
Table VIII: High- and low-debt firms’ results considering the number of female 
directors 
CDA Exp. sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Panel A: High-debt firms 
Intercept ? 0.107*** 
5.376 
0.108*** 
5.420 
0.107*** 
5.368 
0.107*** 
5.351 
0.108*** 
5.382 
NFAM + 
 
0.005 
1.098 
  0.005 
1.124 
INFAM + 
 
 0.001 
-0.132 
 0.001 
-0.071 
FCO 
+ 
 
  -0.003 
-0.389 
-0.006 
-0.719 
SIZE + -0.028*** 
-7.819 
-0.028*** 
-7.868 
-0.028*** 
-7.764 
-0.028*** 
-7.805 
-0.028*** 
-7.803 
OCF + -0.242*** 
-7.772 
-0.245*** 
-8.023 
-0.242*** 
-7.757 
-0.242*** 
-7.767 
-0.245*** 
-8.026 
ROA ? 0.079*** 
3.269 
0.078*** 
3.270 
0.079*** 
3.258 
0.079*** 
3.265 
0.078*** 
3.258 
LEV ? -0.054*** 
-3.765 
-0.055*** 
-3.814 
-0.054*** 
-3.765 
-0.054*** 
-3.748 
-0.055*** 
-3.793 
GSALES ? -0.003 
-0.378 
-0.003 
-0.425 
-0.003 
-0.382 
-0.003 
-0.379 
-0.003 
-0.431 
MB ? 0.000 
-0.018 
0.001 
0.091 
0.001 
-0.023 
0.001 
-0.019 
0.001 
0.094 
LOSS ? -0.037*** 
-4.596 
-0.037*** 
-4.528 
-0.037*** 
-4.599 
-0.037*** 
-4.592 
-0.037*** 
-4.520 
Industry  included included included included included 
Year  included included included included included 
Observations  608 608 608 608 608 
R-squared  0.273 0.274 0.273 0.273 0.274 
F-Value  11.210 11.330 10.720 10.770 10.500 
Panel B: Low-debt firms 
Intercept ? 0.091*** 
6.398 
0.091*** 
6.472 
0.096*** 
6.611 
0.091*** 
6.410 
0.097*** 
6.711 
NFAM + 
 
0.009** 
2.435 
  0.012*** 
2.660 
INFAM + 
 
 0.008** 
2.562 
 0.008*** 
2.679 
FCO 
+ 
 
  0.008 
0.910 
-0.011 
-0.934 
SIZE + -0.021*** 
-7.244 
-0.022*** 
-7.385 
-0.024*** 
-7.512 
-0.022*** 
-7.247 
-0.024*** 
-7.706 
OCF + -0.289*** 
-10.150 
-0.291*** 
-10.427 
-0.291*** 
-10.315 
-0.290*** 
-10.180 
-0.293*** 
-10.597 
ROA ? 0.116*** 
3.583 
0.112*** 
3.545 
0.116*** 
3.556 
0.117*** 
3.588 
0.110*** 
3.466 
LEV ? -0.036*** 
-2.258 
-0.036** 
-2.306 
-0.035** 
-2.203 
-0.035** 
-2.210 
-0.037** 
-2.297 
GSALES ? -0.004 
-1.561 
-0.005 
-1.724 
-0.004 
-1.526 
-0.005 
-1.681 
-0.004 
-1.623 
MB ? 0.001 
0.355 
0.001 
0.345 
0.001 
0.361 
0.001 
0.286 
0.001 
0.429 
LOSS ? -0.032*** 
-3.541 
-0.033*** 
-3.767 
-0.032*** 
-3.595 
-0.032*** 
-3.545 
-0.034*** 
-3.875 
Industry  included included included included included 
Year  included included included included included 
Observations  609 609 609 609 609 
R-squared  0.323 0.330 0.330 0.325 0.338 
F-Value  10.490 10.850 10.300 10.160 10.430 
CDA = Current discretionary accruals using the modified Jones model; NFAM= Number of female directors 
on the board; INFAM = Number of independent female directors on the board; FCO = Dummy variable 
equals 1 if the CFO of the firm is female, and 0 otherwise; SIZE = Firm size as measured by natural logarithm 
of total assets; OCF = Operating cash flow; ROA = Firm’s performance as measured by net revenue to total 
assets ratio; LEV = Financial leverage as measured by total liabilities to total assets ratio;  GSALES = 
Growing sales; MB = Market-to-book ratio; LOSS = Coded 1 if firm has aloss, and 0 otherwise. 
 
In addition to the numbers, we used the propotion of females as an alternative measure (see 
appendix A), and the results are consistent with the results shown in Table VIII. Further, we 
examined the robustness of the preliminary results in Table V, using the Jones (1991) model 
as an alternative measure of earnings management to investigate whether alternative 
measures of current discretionary accruals affect the primary results presented in Table V.  
 
The equation of the Jones model is calculated as follows: 
CAit/Ait−1 = βit(1 Ait−1)⁄ + β1it (∆REVit Ait−1)⁄ + εit                                          (3) 
 
As can be seen from Table IX, the findings are consistent with the main results in Table V, 
suggesting that the main findings are robust for different measurements of earnings 
management.  
 
Table IX: Regression results concerning the number of female: calculated with the 
Jones model 
CA Exp. sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept ? 0.049*** 
4.824 
0.049*** 
4.863 
0.052*** 
5.000 
0.049*** 
4.837 
0.052*** 
5.040 
NFAM + 
 
0.007** 
2.353   
0.007** 
2.041 
INFAM + 
  
0.005** 
2.117  
0.005** 
2.129 
FCO 
+ 
   
0.010 
1.374 
0.001 
0.030 
SIZE + -0.010*** 
-4.402 
-0.010*** 
-4.480 
-0.011*** 
-4.647 
-0.010*** 
-4.401 
-0.011*** 
-4.716 
OCF + -0.272*** 
-11.830 
-0.274*** 
-12.199 
-0.274*** 
-11.929 
-0.272*** 
-11.838 
-0.277*** 
-12.292 
ROA ? 0.102*** 
4.766 
0.100*** 
4.746 
0.103*** 
4.811 
0.102*** 
4.771 
0.101*** 
4.795 
LEV ? -0.027*** 
-3.134 
-0.027*** 
-3.226 
-0.027*** 
-3.151 
-0.026*** 
-3.065 
-0.027*** 
-3.246 
GSALES ? -0.002 
-0.691 
-0.002 
-0.766 
-0.002 
-0.644 
-0.002 
-0.753 
-0.002 
-0.721 
MB ? 0.001 
0.783 
0.001 
0.908 
0.001 
0.833 
0.001 
0.758 
0.001 
0.960 
LOSS ? -0.035*** 
-5.436 
-0.035*** 
-5.514 
-0.035*** 
-5.411 
-0.035*** 
-5.450 
-0.035*** 
-5.486 
Industry  included included included included included 
Year  included included included included included 
Observations  1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 
R-squared  0.229 0.233 0.232 0.23 0.235 
F-Value  11.670*** 12.300*** 11.140*** 11.220*** 11.280*** 
CDA = Current discretionary accruals using the Jones model; NFAM= Number of female directors on the 
board; INFAM = Number of independent female directors on the board; FCO = Dummy variable equals 1 if 
the CFO of the firm is female, and 0 otherwise; SIZE = Firm size as measured by natural logarithm of total 
assets; OCF = Operating cash flow; ROA = Firm’s performance as measured by net revenue to total assets 
ratio; LEV = Financial leverage as measured by total liabilities to total assets ratio;  GSALES = Growing sales; 
MB = Market-to-book ratio; LOSS = 1 if firm has a loss, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Furthermore, we re-estimated all the prevous regressions in Table IX by using the proportion 
of female directors as an alternative measure of female directors on the board. The results 
(see appendix B) are similar to the findings presented in Table IX, suggesting that the main 
results in this paper are robust and consistent with the different measures of females and 
current discretionary accruals.  
 
Pooled OLS regression was used in the main analysis to predict the relationship between 
female directors and earnings management. In order to test the robustness of the main result, 
we applied pooled OLS with robust regression as an alternative regression estimator, which 
shows results similar to the primary findings. The findings of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
and tolerance tests reveal that the highest value of VIF is for ROA, at 1.37, which is lower 
than the critical value of 10 (Gujarati 2003, p.339). This result indicates that our model does 
not suffer from multicollinearity. Finally, we tested whether there are any heteroscedasticity 
issues in our analysis. The Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test reveals that the test statistic 
is insignificant, which indicates that heteroscedasticity is less likely to be a substantive issue 
in our model.   
5 .  Conclusion 
 
In this study, we examine the link between female directors and earnings management 
practices in the UK. The findings show that firms with a higher numbers of female and 
independent female directors tend to adopt more conservative accounting policies compared 
with those companies with lower numbers of female and independent female directors. In 
other words, the research finds that managers in the firms with higher numbers of female and 
independent female directors prefer to engage in income-decreasing rather than income-
increasing earnings management. Following on from this, we further examined whether this 
relationship exists in different types of company. However, the results indicate that female 
directors on the board in high-debt firms have no impact on the levels of earnings 
management. In the low-debt firms, we found that the number of females and independent 
females on the board is positively related to earnings management, indicating that firms in the 
low-debt group with high numbers of female and independent female directors tend to be 
more conservative than companies with low numbers of females and independent females on 
their boards. In both types of company, we noted that the CFO has no impact on the practice 
of earnings management. 
 
The use of accounting discretion to make adjustments in financial statements is a big game 
which itself distorts corporate decision making. This paper adds to this debate by providing 
evidence of the relationship between female representation on corporate boards and earning 
management practices. We have aimed to include all the key characteristics in the model, and 
carried out robustness checks to ensure the rigour of the results. However, the sample consists 
of very large publicly traded companies, and the findings of the study need to be interpreted 
on this basis. Since female representation is limited on corporate boards, their actual 
influence on earnings management may also be limited, but this provides yet another 
argument for our distant dream of gender-balanced corporate boards. 
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Appendix A: 
High- and low-debt firms’ results considering the proportion of female directors 
CDA Exp. sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Panel A: High-debt firms 
Intercept ? 0.100*** 
7.263 
0.100*** 
7.292 
0.102*** 
7.284 
0.100*** 
7.241 
0.102*** 
7.315 
PFAM +  0.074 
1.900 
  0.080 
1.565 
PINFAM +   0.032 
0.994 
 0.035 
1.083 
FCO 
+    0.012 
1.115 
-0.002 
-0.142 
SIZE + -0.026*** 
-7.726 
-0.026*** 
-7.737 
-0.027*** 
-7.737 
-0.026*** 
-7.678 
-0.026*** 
-7.763 
OCF + -0.261*** 
-9.153 
-0.263*** 
-9.419 
-0.263*** 
-9.226 
-0.261*** 
-9.173 
-0.266*** 
-9.527 
ROA ? 0.091*** 
3.748 
0.089*** 
3.702 
0.091*** 
3.758 
0.091*** 
3.773 
0.089*** 
3.692 
LEV ? -0.033*** 
-2.806 
-0.033*** 
-2.837 
-0.034*** 
-2.827 
-0.032*** 
-2.727 
-0.034*** 
-2.844 
GSALES ? -0.004 
-1.342 
-0.004 
-1.407 
-0.004 
-1.297 
-0.004 
-1.390 
-0.004 
-1.355 
MB ? 0.001 
0.015 
0.001 
0.152 
0.001 
0.050 
0.001 
-0.007 
0.001 
0.205 
LOSS ? -0.029*** 
-3.195 
-0.030*** 
-3.293 
-0.030*** 
-3.208 
-0.030*** 
-3.235 
-0.031*** 
-3.305 
Industry  included included included included included 
Year  included included included included included 
Observations  609 609 609 609 609 
R-squared  0.259 0.264 0.260 0.261 0.265 
F-Value  10.290 10.780 9.810 9.930 9.890 
Panel B: Low-debt firms 
Intercept ? 0.093*** 
6.002 
0.092*** 
5.893 
0.095*** 
6.154 
0.093*** 
5.997 
0.094*** 
6.017 
PNFAM +  0.038* 
1.933 
  0.039* 
2.004 
PINFAM +   0.045* 
1.792 
 0.047* 
1.866 
FCO 
+    -0.005 
-0.613 
-0.013 
-1.329 
SIZE + -0.024*** 
-8.402 
-0.024*** 
-8.313 
-0.025*** 
-8.627 
-0.024*** 
-8.391 
-0.025*** 
-8.500 
OCF + -0.294*** 
-8.851 
-0.295*** 
-8.901 
-0.296*** 
-8.916 
-0.293*** 
-8.818 
-0.296*** 
-8.959 
ROA ? 0.096*** 
2.746 
0.095*** 
2.748 
0.099*** 
2.844 
0.096*** 
2.742 
0.098*** 
2.848 
LEV ? -0.033*** 
-3.456 
-0.033*** 
-3.509 
-0.033*** 
-3.471 
-0.033*** 
-3.487 
-0.034*** 
-3.608 
GSALES ? 0.012 
0.618 
0.011 
0.560 
0.012 
0.668 
0.012 
0.641 
0.012 
0.654 
MB ? 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
0.213 0.219 0.329 0.224 0.369 
LOSS ? -0.041*** 
-5.239 
-0.041*** 
-5.292 
-0.040*** 
-5.118 
-0.041*** 
-5.226 
-0.040*** 
-5.158 
Industry  included included included included included 
Year  included included included included included 
Observations  608 608 608 608 608 
R-squared  0.367 0.368 0.370 0.367 0.372 
F-Value  14.580 14.380 14.250 14.220 14.390 
CDA = Current discretionary accruals using the modified Jones model; PFAM= Proportion of female directors 
on the board; PINFAM = Proportion of independent female directors on the board; FCO = Dummy variable 
equals 1 if the CFO of the firm is female, and 0 otherwise; SIZE = Firm size as measured by natural logarithm 
of total assets; OCF = Operating cash flow; ROA = Firm’s performance as measured by net revenue to total 
assets ratio; LEV = Financial leverage as measured by total liabilities to total assets ratio;  GSALES = 
Growing sales; MB = Market-to-book ratio; LOSS = Coded 1 if firm has loss, and 0 otherwise. 
 
  
Appendix B 
Regression results considering the proportion of females: calculated using the Jones 
model 
CA Exp. sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept ? 0.049*** 
4.824 
0.049*** 
4.791 
0.051*** 
4.953 
0.049*** 
4.837 
0.050*** 
4.923 
PFAM +  0.056** 
2.043 
  0.054* 
1.714 
PIFAM +   0.043** 
2.045 
 0.044** 
2.037 
FCO +    0.010 
1.374 
0.001 
0.139 
REVLW + -0.010*** 
-4.402 
-0.010*** 
-4.337 
-0.011*** 
-4.589 
-0.010*** 
-4.401 
-0.011*** 
-4.529 
OCF + -0.272*** 
-11.830 
-0.273*** 
-12.063 
-0.274*** 
-11.946 
-0.272*** 
-11.838 
-0.276*** 
-12.165 
ROA ? 0.102*** 
4.766 
0.101*** 
4.747 
0.104*** 
4.824 
0.102*** 
4.771 
0.102*** 
4.808 
LEV ? -0.027*** 
-3.134 
-0.027*** 
-3.222 
-0.027*** 
-3.165 
-0.026*** 
-3.065 
-0.028*** 
-3.241 
GSALES ? -0.002 
-0.691 
-0.002 
-0.738 
-0.002 
-0.625 
-0.002 
-0.753 
-0.002 
-0.678 
MB ? 0.001 
0.783 
0.001 
0.878 
0.001 
0.869 
0.001 
0.758 
0.001 
0.960 
LOSS ? -0.035*** 
-5.436 
-0.035*** 
-5.490 
-0.035*** 
-5.420 
-0.035*** 
-5.450 
-0.035*** 
-5.471 
Industry  included included included included included 
Year  included included included included included 
Observations  1217 1217 1217 1217 1217 
R-squared  0.229 0.232 0.232 0.230 0.23 
F-Test  11.670*** 12.030*** 11.200*** 11.220*** 11.080*** 
CDA = Current discretionary accruals using the modified Jones model; PFAM= Proportion of female 
directors on the board; PINFAM = Proportion of independent female directors on the board; FCO = Dummy 
variable equals 1 if the CFO of the firm is female, and 0 otherwise; SIZE = Firm size as measured by natural 
logarithm of total assets; OCF = Operating cash flow; ROA = Firm’s performance as measured by net revenue 
to total assets ratio; LEV = Financial leverage as measured by total liabilities to total assets ratio;  GSALES = 
Growing sales; MB = Market-to-book ratio; LOSS = Coded 1 if firm has loss, and 0 otherwise. 
 
